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Abstract. In the Internet of Things a lot of business opportunities may be iden-
tified. The devices in IoT may create ad-hoc temporary networks to provide 
services or share some resources. Such services are characterized by a great 
economical potential, especially while provided at mass-scale and for incidental 
users. However, the development of paid services or resources in IoT is ham-
pered by relatively big transaction costs of payment operations. To deal with 
this problem, we propose a novel architecture of coupon-based, semi-off-line, 
anonymous micropayment system to enable transactions in the scope of Internet 
of Things. User anonymity and security is assured by the usage of standard 
cryptographic techniques together with novel architectural design of the pay-
ment processes. Utilization of a hash function allows generating and verifying 
electronic coins in computationally efficient way, so as to be executed even in 
hardware- and software-restricted environment such as Internet of Things.  
Keywords: micropayments, e-money, Internet of Things, Future Internet. 
1 Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the rapidly developing phenomenon, which undoubt-
edly will influence the society and economy. Originally it was perceived as the intel-
ligent network linking objects, information and people to allow remote coordination 
of resources by humans and machines [3]. However, nowadays IoT is not only limited 
to electronic identification of objects, but it is defined as technology integrating phys-
ical objects with information network, where these objects may act as active partici-
pants in business processes [6].  
Multiple applications of Internet of Things have been identified in such economy 
areas, as manufacturing, supply chains, energy, healthcare, automotive industry and 
insurance, to mention a few [6]. Moreover, the expansion of Internet of Things out-
side the internal infrastructures of companies is expected. Such situation should affect 
the economy by creating human-to-machine (H2M) and machine-to-machine (M2M) 
markets [14]. In these markets, the machines will match business partners and con-
clude contracts, according to the preferences of their owners. 
In the Internet of Things markets the devices will cooperate by creating temporary 
networks to exchange data. The devices are expected to provide services on the mass 
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scale, but the business relations will be temporary, and often formed on an ad-hoc 
basis. The devices in Future Internet will be used locally, but at mass scale and in 
many places. Similarly, the particular payments will be made in micro scale, but all 
transactions will have the global character. One of the features of the services provid-
ed by devices from IoT network is activity-based micro-pricing, which means that 
clients are charged by exact time, amount and sort of services they consume [14]. 
Therefore, to make the provision of ad-hoc services profitable, an efficient micro-
payment system is required.  
The micropayment system suitable for the transactions in Internet of Things should 
observe the following requirements. First, it should be possible to implement the sys-
tem worldwide, by avoiding intermediaries (e.g., a clearing house). Second, the finan-
cial institution should bear possible minimal computation costs. Third, a user should 
be able to make a payment off-line in order to decrease the costs of a network connec-
tion, which in particular cases may exceed the value of purchased goods or services 
(e.g., mobile data transfer under roaming circumstances). Fourth, the vendor should 
contact a financial institution as seldom as possible. Fifth, the anonymity of the user 
should be assured by a prevention of payment tracking. Sixth, the security of transac-
tion should be assured by the encryption and the prevention of double spending or 
forgery. 
To deal with the above problems, an anonymous, semi-offline, micropayment sys-
tem for transactions in Internet of Things is proposed in this paper. The contribution 
of the proposed solution in the field of anonymous micropayment systems and Inter-
net of Things is described in Section 2. The state of the art of micropayment systems 
is reviewed in Section 3. In Section 4 overall architecture and main protocols of mi-
cropayment system suitable for micro-transactions in Internet of Things are proposed. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Contribution of Proposed System to the Internet of Things 
In the paper a new architecture of micropayment system adjusted to the requirements 
of business transactions in Internet of Things (IoT) is presented. The proposed micro-
payment system meets the needs of human-to-machine and machine-to-machine mar-
kets, where efficient processing of many small-amount transactions is required. Alt-
hough plenty of anonymous micropayment systems were proposed in the literature, 
the state of the art reveals that none of them is suitable for transactions in Internet of 
Things. However, the coupon-based systems, originally proposed to handle pay per 
view payments on the websites, seem to fit the gap.  
A good starting point to realize the idea presented in the paper is related with a mi-
cro-payments architecture originally proposed by Wilusz and Rykowski [15]. Howev-
er, in order to fulfill above-mentioned requirements of IoT transactions, this architec-
ture was significantly modified. First, the clearing house became an unnecessary in-
termediary and in our proposition a financial institution is sufficient to handle both 
coin issue and clearing. Second, the coin registration was changed by putting this 
activity into a vendor task, so that each coin is registered during its first use. Moreo-
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ver, this solution strengthened user anonymity, by an elimination of a possibility of 
user (e.g., his personal device) tracking. Third, the coin blocking procedure was im-
proved by setting the final date for blocking a coin by a vendor. Fourth, the user and 
vendor specify together in anonymous way the account to be credited, which, by an 
application of cryptographic methods, improves security of the proposed solution. 
According to the long tail concept [2], the Internet of Things has a huge economic 
potential of services or resources being sold for micro-price in huge amounts to plenty 
of incidental clients. The potential areas of application of micropayments in IoT are as 
follows: transportation services (pay per exact distance or number of stops), services 
concerning augmented reality (virtual guides in a museum or multimedia concerning 
cultural heritage objects), a reduction of external effects in public spaces (payments 
for using a car in city centers), and services in public spaces (vending machines, toi-
lets or waiting rooms), to mention a few. However, because of the lack of efficient 
payment method, high transaction costs strongly limit IoT market. The proposed ar-
chitecture will allow implementing an efficient micropayment system suitable for 
payments in IoT. The system, once become de facto standard, will cause the IoT mar-
ket to flourish on international scale. 
3 State of the Art 
There were proposed numerous micropayments schemes in the literature. However, to 
our best knowledge none of them is suitable for the payments in the IoT environment.  
Most of already implemented micropayment systems are based on the prepaid ac-
count and aggregation of particular payments by single payment system operator 
(e.g., Amazon Flexible Payment Service [1] or GeldKarte [5]). In this approach ven-
dors and clients are bound to a single payment service provider, which consolidates 
clients’ micropayments into macropayments made to the sellers at the end of specified 
period. The micropayments aggregation by one entity is not proper for IoT transac-
tions, as purchases happen rather irregularly, incidentally and should be possible 
worldwide. Moreover, this solution lacks anonymity, as service provider can track 
each payment [13]. 
Another sort of micropayment schemes applies probability approach to make mi-
cropayments effective (e.g., schemes proposed by Micali and Rivest [8] or Lipton and 
Ostrovsky [10]). The foundation of these systems is based on an assumption that users 
make a lot of purchases and vendors have huge volume in sales. Under this assump-
tion, it is enough to provide a coin, which with probability of s will be payable 
amount of 1/s to assure that users will pay and vendors will get amount close to their 
expenses and earnings. However, there are following drawbacks of such a solution. 
First, no anonymity is assured, as each user is obliged to sign transaction details. Se-
cond, the probabilistic scheme has features of a wager (one may win or lose depend-
ing on result of some activity) rather than sale (getting goods or services for an 
amount of money). Third, both user and vendor are required to have PKI certificates. 
The third group of micropayment schemes is coupon-based, which utilizes the idea 
of hash chains [7] (e.g. PayWord [12], Payeras-Capella et. al. scheme [11] or Wilusz 
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and Rykowski architecture [15]). In coupon-based systems an electronic coin is repre-
sented by the last output of a hash function applied iteratively to some seed. This 
approach enables the electronic coin to be spent in fractions, by presenting the vendor 
a set of chain nodes. Although, the general scheme presented by Rivest [12] missed 
the anonymity and allowed user to exceed their bank-account limits, it was improved 
by Payeras-Capella et al. [11] by an application of Chaum’s blind signature protocol 
[4]. However, in this scheme, a user needs to contact financial institution directly 
before the payment in order to produce merchant-specific hash chain. Moreover, the 
Authors do not mention what happens with unspent tokens of merchant specific hash 
chain, and it appears that unspent value is lost in favor of the financial institution. 
Wilusz and Rykowski [15] proposed improved, anonymous coupon based micropay-
ment system. In their proposition the user contacts the financial institution only during 
coin issue phase. During the payment process only the vendor needs to stay on-line. 
The proposition of locking the coin by the vendor at the clearing house solved the 
problem of double spending, and in advance to the Payeras-Capella et al. [11] 
scheme, there is no need to generate merchant-specific coins. Moreover, unspent frac-
tion of the coin may be used in further transactions, provided that the coin was un-
blocked by the merchant. However, there are still some drawbacks of this system. 
First, the presence of the clearing house increases transaction costs and hampers the 
worldwide expansion of the system. Second, there is a serious risk, that the vendor 
will not unblock the coin after the payment.  
The decentralized micropayment systems such as Bitcoin [9] are becoming more 
popular. However the decentralized systems appear to be of limited trust, as there is 
no central authority controlling the supply of virtual currency. Moreover, the security 
of Bitcoin system is preserved under condition that the majority of Bitcoin network 
nodes are honest. The botnet attack poses a real risk of Bitcoins forgery or 
doublespending. The above mentioned traits of Bitcoin system cause, that this solu-
tion is not suitable for mass scale payments in the Internet of Things. 
The analysis of the state of the art in micropayment systems indicate that there is 
no solution meeting all the requirements of transactions in the Internet of Things. 
However, the Wilusz and Rykowski solution [15] has a potential, after some modifi-
cation, to meet the needs of H2M and M2M markets. In this paper, we propose some 
extensions and improvements to this approach, to be described in the next section. 
4 Architecture of Micropayment System for Internet of Things 
The architecture and protocols of a micropayment system for Internet of Things, pre-
sented in this section, are the results of significant improvements of the proposition of 
Wilusz and Rykowski [15]. The introduced changes enabled the system to meet the 
requirements of micro transactions on both H2M and M2M markets.  
The proposed system is coupon-based, which means that the hash chain concept is 
used to produce divisible coin. Such a solution decreases computation costs of a fi-
nancial institution, as it is enough to sign the coin once and further this coin may be 
spent in fractions. The anonymity is assured by an application of Chaum’s blind sig-
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nature scheme. In the result, a financial institution is not able to link the coin identifier 
with a user. Additionally, the vendor stands for an entity to register a coin at financial 
institution, which strengthens the user anonymity, as no IP tracking of end-user de-
vice is possible. The financial institution F generates the coin in return for money, so 
the coin bears obligation of F to accept it and pay the holder (e.g. by banking trans-
fer). As a result there is no need to involve a clearing house in the payment process, as 
the financial institution, that issued a coin, takes care of coin clearing. What is more, a 
user needs an Internet connection only to get new coins from F. In Internet of Things, 
a user (a person or a device) contacts a vendor (a person or a device) by a short-range 
radio communication. Moreover, the vendor V uses the Internet, to contact F, only 
when blocking the coin or finishing the transaction. The idea of indexing and block-
ing of coins together with storing the last spent token in financial institution database, 
prevents the double spending issue. In the system a coin may be blocked only till 
specified date T. Additionally the user U specifies who should be credited by using 
vendor’s certificate, which prevents any eavesdropper from gaining benefit. 
Figure 1 presents the participants of the system and their interactions. In the next 
sections the coin generation protocol and payment protocol are described in details. 
 
Fig. 1. Overall system architecture. 
4.1 Coin Generation  Protocol 
In the proposed system, the coins generated by a financial institution are of fixed val-
ue M and may be divided into n fractions (tokens). Each token has specified value 
equal to M/n. The divisibility of a coin is achieved by an application of hashchain 
concept, while the anonymity is assured by the use of Chaum’s blind signature 
scheme. The coin generation protocol consists of three phases: blind coin generation, 
blind coin signing and a removal of a blind factor. 
In the first phase, the user U generates a random seed S, which is kept in secret. 
Then, hash function H() is performed iteratively on the seed. Next, the user generates 
random blinding factor r and finds its reverse modulo N (where N is modulus of fi-
nancial institution RSA public key). Finally, blinding factor r is encrypted with finan-
cial institution RSA public key e and multiplied modulo N by the coin identifier (last 
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value of hash chain Hn(S)). As a result of this operation a blinded coin Hn(S)re mod N 
is produced.  
During the second phase, the user is authorized in the payment system and sends 
the blinded coin to the financial institution, which in turn debits user account and 
signs blinded coin with RSA decryption key d. Then, the signed blinded coin 
Hn(S)dred mod N is returned to the user U. 
In the last phase, the user removes the blinding factor. As the red mod N is equal to 
r mod N it is sufficient to multiply the blinded coin by the r reverse modulo N 
(r-1 mod N), because the following congruence is met rr-1≡ r0≡1 (mod N) [4].  
 
 
4.2 Payment Protocol 
At the beginning of a transaction, the user U and the vendor V both agree on the date 
T of finishing transaction (the final date till which the coin will be blocked at a finan-
cial institution). Additionally, the vendor provides to the user its certificate C contain-
ing credentials and bank account details. The user sends to the vendor the following 
items: the signed coin, encrypted concatenation of the last unspent token Hn-m(S) 
(where n>=m) with T, and encrypted concatenation of Hn-m(S) with C. This proves 
that U (the only entity knowing Hn-m(S)) authorizes vendor V identified by certificate 
C to block the coin identified by H(S)dmod N till the date T.  
In the next step vendor V sends C, T, the coin Hn(S)d mod N and both concatena-
tions (Hn-m(S)||T)e mod N and (Hn-m (S)||C)e mod N to the financial institution F. Then, 
the financial institution F uses its encryption key e, in order to obtain coin identifier 
Hn(S) from signed coin H(S)dmod N. Next, the financial institution F decrypts 
(Hn-m(S)||T)emod N and (Hn-m(S)||C)emod N with its decryption key d and retrieves 
Hn-m(S). Then, the financial institution F checks if the coin was already registered. In 
the case of a new coin, the financial institution F checks if H(Hn-m(S)) is equal to 
Hn(S). If this checking succeeded, the coin Hn(S) is registered in the database by stor-
ing  the coin Hn(S)d mod N , coin identifier Hn(S), and first token Hn-1(S) (in this case 
m=1). If the coin was already registered, the financial institution F checks if the token 
Hn-m(S) is the predecessor of the previously spent token Hn-m+1(S) by verification of 
the following equation Hn-m+1(S)=H(Hn-m(S )).  In the next step, the coin is blocked for 
the period T for the vendor V identified by the certificate C. Then, financial institution 
F sends to the vendor V the last spent token Hn-m(S) and a position (n-m) of this token 
in the hashchain. The position of the token in hashchain determines the remaining 
value of the coin ((n-m)M/n).  
After having validity and blocking of the coin confirmed by financial institution F, 
the vendor V starts charging the user U the micro prices by requesting tokens repre-
senting particular value. Then the user U provides the vendor V the token Hn-m-q(S) of 
value qM/n and the order number n-m-q (where n>=m+q). The token is verified by 
Coin generation protocol 
U→F: user credentials, Hn (S) re mod N 
F→U: Hn (S)d red mod N 
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the vendor V by checking if Hq(Hn-m-q(S))= Hn-m(S). If the checking is positive, the 
goods or services may be provided. The request and validation of the tokens may be 
repeated during the consumption of services or goods purchase, in the case when the 
user U is charged on the pay per use (or unit) basis. For a next service use, the user U 
is requested for next token Hn-m-q-p(S) of value pM/n. The vendor V provides proper 
token and this process continues till the end of the transaction. 
At the end of the payment the vendor V sends to the financial institution F the coin 
Hn(S)d mod N, last received token Hn-m-q-p(S), and order number n-m-q-p 
(where n>= m+q+p). The financial institution F locates the coin in its database and 
stores the last token. Then, the coin is unblocked and vendor’s bank account may be 
credited. If the total value M of the coin is spent (in the case of n-m-p-q = 0), it is 
marked as invalid. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, an anonymous semi-off-line micropayment system for transactions in 
Internet of Things is proposed. The improvements described in the text allowed sim-
plifying the architecture, strengthening user anonymity and protocols security. The 
intermediary clearing house became unnecessary and was removed from the architec-
ture, which caused a simplification of communication and transactional overheads of 
the proposed solution. The original approach of the vendor being the entity who regis-
ters the coin at a financial institution has been applied. This solution caused an in-
crease of the user-anonymity level by disabling communication tracking possibilities. 
Moreover, the coin management in payment process enhanced security of the solu-
tion, for at least two reasons. First, encrypted concatenation of token with blocking 
date prevents the suspension of coin in financial institution database. Second, the 
concatenation of token with vendor’s certificate ensures that the vendor gets the pay-
ment, because any malicious intervention in the protocol cannot change the benefi-
ciary. 
The proposed system meets the specific needs of financial transactions in Internet 
of Things by decreasing transaction costs concerning the payment process. What is 
Payment protocol 
V→U: T, C 
U→V: Hn (S)d mod N , (Hn-m (S)||T) e mod N, (Hn-m (S)||C) e mod N 
V→F: T, C, Hn (S)d mod N , (Hn-m (S)||T) e mod N, (Hn-m (S)||C) e mod N 
F→V: Hn-m (S), n-m 
V→U: Request for tokens 
U→V: Hn-m-q (S), n-m-q 
V→U: Request for tokens 
U→V: Hn-m-q-p (S), n-m-q-p 
V→F: Hn (S)d mod N, Hn-m-q-p (S), n-m-q-p 
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more, proposed solution may be implemented on wide range of payment instruments 
concerning smartcards or smartphones. The payment protocol is easy to be executed 
by even small devices, and users are required only to formulate an intention of a pay-
ment. Additionally, a coin management system may be proposed, which would opti-
mize the choice and strategies of coin spending with different vendors. We do hope 
that the proposed micropayment system will allow several new, commercial innova-
tions to emerge within the scope of Internet of Things.  
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